Investigating these phishing attempts leads down a very dark hole indeed.
The eNom phishing sites are attempting to gather up domain information. For what purposes exactly is unsure, but I'm sure you could imagine: theft of a large number of domains, redirection of previously "good" domains to harmful content.
The contact information on these sites is all identical, and should be familiar to anyone who investigates this crap. Let's take one example domain, sys82.net:
Whois sys82.net
Domain Name: SYS82.NET
Registrar: ONLINENIC, INC.
Whois Server: whois.onlinenic.com
Referral URL: http://www.OnlineNIC.com
Name Server: NS1.KOLBERACN.COM
Name Server: NS2.KOLBERACN.COM
Name Server: NS3.KOLBERACN.COM
Name Server: NS4.KOLBERACN.COM
Name Server: NS5.KOLBERACN.COM
Status: ok
Updated Date: 25-oct-2008
Creation Date: 25-oct-2008
Expiration Date: 25-oct-2009
...
Domain servers in listed order:
ns1.kolberacn.com ns2.kolberacn.com
Administrator:
Name-- Shestakov Yuriy
EMail-: (alexeyvas@safe-mail.net)
tel --: +7.9218839910
org: Shestakov Yuriy
Lenina 21 16
Mirniy,MSK,RU 102422
Technical Contactor:
Name-- Shestakov Yuriy
EMail-: (alexeyvas@safe-mail.net)
tel --: +7.9218839910
org: Shestakov Yuriy
Lenina 21 16
Mirniy,MSK,RU 102422
Billing Contactor:
Name-- Shestakov Yuriy
EMail-: (alexeyvas@safe-mail.net)
tel --: +7.9218839910
org: Shestakov Yuriy
Lenina 21 16
Mirniy,MSK,RU 102422
Registration Service Provider:
name: Shestakov Yuriy
tel: +7.9218839910
fax: +7.9218839910
web:
Let's examine what else those dns servers are supporting:
ns1.kolberacn.com
lolita-bbs.name NS ns1.kolberacn.com
ns1.kolberacn.com A 68.48.197.101
ns1.kolberacn.com A 68.80.158.76
ns1.kolberacn.com A 72.2.13.24
ns1.kolberacn.com A 75.60.192.242
ns1.kolberacn.com A 75.187.202.144
ns1.kolberacn.com A 97.82.229.170
ns1.kolberacn.com A 98.229.69.62
ns1.kolberacn.com A 99.245.182.179
xlpreview.com NS ns1.kolberacn.com
sys82.net NS ns1.kolberacn.com
com94.net NS ns1.kolberacn.com
weblola.net NS ns1.kolberacn.com
littlelolita.net NS ns1.kolberacn.com
nude-kids.net NS ns1.kolberacn.com
xlsites.net NS ns1.kolberacn.com
The server state is: 201 Okay
ns2.kolberacn.com
lolita-bbs.name NS ns2.kolberacn.com
ns2.kolberacn.com A 65.182.248.145
ns2.kolberacn.com A 66.30.49.194
ns2.kolberacn.com A 68.48.197.101
ns2.kolberacn.com A 68.80.158.76
ns2.kolberacn.com A 69.208.85.23
ns2.kolberacn.com A 72.2.13.24
ns2.kolberacn.com A 75.60.192.242
ns2.kolberacn.com A 76.112.161.176
ns2.kolberacn.com A 99.245.182.179
ns2.kolberacn.com A 209.60.226.164
ns2.kolberacn.com A 209.252.169.130
xlpreview.com NS ns2.kolberacn.com
sys82.net NS ns2.kolberacn.com
com94.net NS ns2.kolberacn.com
weblola.net NS ns2.kolberacn.com
littlelolita.net NS ns2.kolberacn.com
nude-kids.net NS ns2.kolberacn.com
xlsites.net NS ns2.kolberacn.com
The server state is: 201 Okay
And the rest are supporting several other domains featuring the enom phishing setup.
Note the diversity of the ip addresses associated with those domains: every single one of these is being hosted via a botnet, assumedly home computers infected with the Asprox infection. I had been reading up on several investigations into that exploit, and now it appears it's directly a part of my own spam investigations.
Many of the domains supported by those name servers are, of course, sites which promote, sell, and distribute child pornography. Fortunately, as I write this, all of these sites are not responding. (Good work on getting those shut down, whoever you are.)
A quick investigation of one of those sites leads to a payment processing site known as Avalonpay.com. A quick search on that domain turns up an interesting blog entry on matchent.com concerning a similar investigation. The registrant contact data for that domain includes the company name "Absolutee Corp. Ltd.", allegedly based in Hong Kong:
Note the company name used, ABSOLUTEE CORP. LTD.
Compare with an article in Wired News, http://www.wired.com/politics/security/news/2007/10/russian_network , about the Russian Business Network from October 2007, quote:
"Jaret [note: speaking on behalf of RBN] also says there's no mystery about the company's ownership. According to Jaret, an offshore company called First Connect Telecom Limited Inc. owns RBN, though the company's principals remain anonymous. The registration information for the company's website lists a company called Absolutee Corp. LTD as the owner of the domain name. "
The article also mentioned that the whois info for RBN was changed later. And it has now expired.
So:
- eNom Phishing sites (all featuring alexeyvas@safe-mail.net contact email in whois.)
- Rogue DNS servers (All featuring fake Chinese registrant information in whois.)
- Child porn sites (All featuring absolutee.com registrant information in whois.)
- Avalonpay.com (Payment processor for child porn sites, also featuring absolutee.com registrant information in whois.)
ALL hosted using botnet-supported fast-flux servers.
You would think that this guy's days in this industry were numbered, but sadly you'd be wrong, at least to gauge it from how long he's maintained these operations.
I would love it if anyone from Russian law enforcement would investigate this scumbag. I guess I would first have to figure out how much they charge to do that. (Pardon my cynicism.)
Stay far, far away from any email related to these eNom "securiy bulletin" emails.
SiL / IKS / concerned citizen